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Existing theories of political economy, liberal as well as Marxist, see capital as a dual 
entity. According to these theories, the “real” essence of capital consists of mate-
rial/productive commodities, while the “financial” appearance of capital either accu-
rately mirrors or fictitiously distorts this underlying reality. We reject this duality. 
Capital, we argue, is finance, and only finance. In its modern incarnation, capital 
exists as forward-looking capitalization, a universal financial ritual that discounts 
expected future earnings to a singular present value.  
The universality of this reduction makes capitalization the most supple power in-
strument ever known to humanity. Previously, distributive power was associated 
with clear socio-ecological distinctions – differences between king and subject, owner 
and slave, tiller and landlord, field and citadel, village and town. Capitalization flat-
tens these qualitative features to the point of irrelevance. In principle, anyone can be 
a capitalist, and what distinguishes one capitalist from another is the quantity of their 
capitalization: the most powerful are those with the greatest capitalization (dominant 
capital), and those that hold that power achieve and augment it by increasing their 
capitalization faster than others (differential accumulation). In this way, capitaliza-
tion crystallizes the power of capitalists to shape their world, as well as the resistance 
of those that oppose this power. It gauges the capitalists’ success in directing produc-
tion and consumption, in shaping ideology and culture, in affecting the law, public 
policy, conflict, war and even the environment. It is the all-encompassing algorithm 
that creorders – or creates the order – of the capitalist mode of power.  
The purpose of our paper is to examine the breakdown of this algorithm. To be 
sure, this type of inquiry is hardly novel. Marxists have long searched for objective 
signs of capitalist collapse, preliminary omens that would foretell the system’s immi-
                                                 
1 Shimshon Bichler teaches political economy at colleges and universities in Israel. Jonathan 
Nitzan teaches political economy at York University in Toronto. All of their publications are 
freely available from The Bichler & Nitzan Archives (http://bnarchives.net). A shorter version of 
this paper first appeared in Dollars & Sense (Nitzan and Bichler 2009b). The basic concepts in 
this article, along with their significance for the modern capitalist epoch, are articulated and 
explored more fully in Nitzan and Bichler (2009a).  
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nent disintegration. However, because of their dual conception of capital, they’ve 
tended to look for such signs in the so-called real sphere of production and consump-
tion, while paying far less attention to finance, which, in their view, is merely a dis-
torted mirror of that reality. But finance isn’t a mirror of real capital; it is real capital 
– and indeed the only real capital. So if we want to look for signs of systemic crisis 
and possible disintegration, our search should begin here, in the very ritual of capi-
talization. 
The specific focus of the article is two historical ruptures of modern finance – the 
periods of 1929-1939 and 2000-2010. During both periods, capitalists abandoned the 
conventional forward-looking ritual of capitalization, resorting instead to the back-
ward-looking posture of pre-modern finance. In our view, these rare episodes are of 
great importance for understanding the nature of capitalist confidence and the capi-
talists’ ability to rule – as well as the possibility that this system of rule will collapse. 
Our inquiry seeks, first, to characterize key features of these episodes; second, to 
speculate on their causes; and third, to assess, however speculatively, what they 
might imply for the future of capitalism. 
 
Propositions 
 
We set the stage with a number of related propositions. These propositions aim to 
establish a “nested relationship” between a series of entities – beginning from the 
broad concept of a mode of power, and continuing with confidence in obedience, 
dominant ideology, the ritual of capitalization and the forward-looking disposition of 
modern finance. Most of time, the components of this nested relationship are mutu-
ally reinforcing. But on rare occasions the relationship implodes. The trigger for such 
implosion is systemic fear: fearing for the collapse of their system, capitalists lose 
sight of the future; with the future having become opaque, the ritual of capitalization 
falls into disarray; with capitalization having been punctured, dominant ideology is 
deeply shaken; with dominant ideology having cracked, the capitalists’ confidence in 
obedience tumbles; and with no confidence in obedience, the very continuation of 
the capitalist mode of power is put into question. Let’s examine the relationship be-
tween these concepts more closely, beginning with power.  
 
 Modes of power and confidence in obedience. Hierarchical societies, we argue, are 
characterized by their modes of power. Every mode of power – whether slave-
based, feudal or capitalist – rests on confidence in obedience: the confidence of 
rulers in the obedience of their subjects. This confidence is never perfect: the 
ruled often resist, rise up and revolt; occasionally they demand and periodically 
achieve moderate change; sometimes they even manage to effect significant re-
form; and in very rare instances they take over power, though only for a brief 
historical moment. But as long as the bottom-up disobedience of the underlying 
population does not significantly undermine the top-down confidence of those 
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who rule them – a breach that seldom happens on a large enough scale – the 
mode of power itself remains intact. 
 
 Confidence in obedience and dominant ideology. The framework that shapes and fix-
ates this confidence in obedience is the dominant dogma, or ideology: the broad 
belief system that propels and restricts the social imagination. The dogma or ide-
ology that dominates a given mode of power conditions action and inaction, jus-
tifies the prevailing social structure and provides its organizing principles. It 
molds rulers and ruled alike – and in so doing locks them both into the same 
mode of power.  
 
 Dominant ideology and capitalization. The dominant ideology of modern capitalism 
revolves around the ritual of capitalization: the financial algorithm that dis-
counts expected future earnings to their present value. This ritual is all pervasive. 
The capitalist system is denominated in prices, and for the past century or so, the 
habitual price-setting mechanism has been capitalization. Discounting seems to 
pervade every thing and every process: it determines the prices of human life and 
its genomic code; it sets the prices of consumer goods and services, it generates 
the prices of corporate assets and government debt; it calculates the prices of 
military operations and humanitarian aid; it is even used to compute the price of 
our ecological future. The imperatives of capitalization are accepted, internalized 
and obeyed, usually without question, by the rulers as well as the ruled – and 
that acceptance makes capitalization central to the dominant ideology of our so-
ciety. 
 
 Capitalization and the forward-looking outlook. The ritual of capitalization is fever-
ishly forward looking: it is concerned not with the past or the present, but with 
the future. The elementary particles of capitalization – earnings, investors’ hype, 
risk perceptions and the normal rate of return – represent not what is known to 
have happened, but what is expected to happen. The expectations themselves are 
inherently uncertain and always in flux. But underneath their shifts and turns, 
one thing remains constant: the conviction that the capitalization process itself 
will continue to rule and organize humanity, forever.  
 
This latter conviction is necessary for the existence of modern capitalism, at least 
in its present form, and the easiest way to demonstrate that necessity is to assume it 
away. Suppose for argument’s sake that capitalists, instead of expecting capitaliza-
tion to continue indefinitely, believed that the process would cease to exist at some 
future point. At that point, with capitalization gone, their assets would have a nil 
value, by definition; and with future prices being zero, current prices would have no-
where to trend but down. Now, the fact that capitalists invest shows that they expect 
the very opposite – i.e., that the value of their assets will grow, not contract – and 
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that expectation means that, consciously or not, they also think that the ritual that 
valuates their assets will never end.2 
These propositions lead to two related conclusions. First, they suggest that the 
very existence of capitalization attests to the capitalist confidence in obedience. The fact 
that this ritual is so pervasive implies that most people believe it will remain so; and 
the only way for this ritual to remain pervasive is if capitalists are convinced that 
they can continue to impose it on a society that is unwilling or unable to oppose it. 
The second conclusion is that a protracted breach of capitalization – a period during 
which the ritual breaks down – signifies the loss of confidence in obedience, the po-
tential disintegration of the dominant ideology and, ultimately, a threat to the very 
existence of the capitalist mode of power. If correct, these conclusions can offer a 
quantitative insight into the long-term outlook of the ruling capitalist class – and, by 
extension, into the prospect of systemic change to the capitalist mode of power.  
The first question, then, is how do we know that capitalization has “broken 
down”? What are the features of such a breakdown? How do these features differ 
from investment as usual? Can these features be quantified – and if so, how? 
 
Takeoff 
 
To begin answering these questions, let us backtrack a bit and consider the situation 
in early 2010. The capitalist class is finally seeing light at the end of the tunnel. For 
many months now, its analysts, statisticians and public officials have been spotting 
“green shoots” everywhere they look. The snowballing global recession, they say, 
seems to have slowed down and perhaps even ended. Managers the world over are 
purchasing more inputs after a period of buying much less; the factories of Asian 
exporters are running at full steam; raw material prices have rebounded strongly; 
bank lending is reviving and home owners are starting to refinance their mortgages at 
lower rates; and in the United States, the world’s biggest producer-consumer, initial 
unemployment claims seem to have peaked, while consumers are beginning to 
loosen their purse strings. But the most important sign that the worst of the crisis is 
over comes from the equity market: stock prices are the ultimate barometer of capi-
talist health, and they have been soaring. 
The market takeoff is evident in Figure 1. The chart traces the U.S. dollar price 
of three key indices – all world equities, U.S. equities, and the equities of the U.S. 
FIRE sector (finance, insurance and real estate). All three indices show a sharp, syn-
chronized rise. In slightly more than a year, from February 2009 to April 2010, the 
world index gained 67%, the U.S. index 62%, and the U.S. FIRE index – previously 
the most battered of the three – a whopping 93%.  
                                                 
2 Note that this conviction is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. For modern accumula-
tion to exist, many other conditions have to hold as well.  
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Figure 1 
Stock Market Prices 
www.bnarchives.net
+67% from bottom
+62% from bottom
+93% from bottom
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Indices denote month-end closing prices. They are ex-
pressed in $U.S. and rebased with January 2002=100. The last data 
points are for April 30, 2010. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) for the 
world stock market index; TOTMKUS(PI) for the U.S. stock mar-
ket index; FINANUS(PI) for the U.S. FIRE index).  
 
Suddenly, the bulls are everywhere. The greatest returns are usually earned dur-
ing the initial part of a rally, and no respectable fund manager likes being beaten by a 
rising average. With the economy apparently bottoming out and with the stock mar-
ket having been in a major bear phase for nearly a decade, investors are no longer 
afraid of losing money; their fear now is not making enough of it.3 And so arises the 
                                                 
3 Given the extent of the crash, some strategists had already started to speak of an imminent 
bull run in late 2008. But the bulk of the pack remained in watchful waiting, and it was only in 
mid 2009, after the market had finally turned, that run-of-the-mill analysts started to claim 
they had anticipated it all along. For a historical examination of major bear markets and sub-
sequent bull runs, see Bichler and Nitzan (2008).  
- 5 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capitalism 
specter of “panic buying,” a frenzied attempt to jump on the bandwagon before the 
really large gains are gone.4 
Of course, not everyone buys this rosy scenario. Many observers continue to feel 
that the recent stock market rally is no more than a dead-cat bounce. In the eyes of 
the pessimists, investors are knee-jerking to a false start. The economic recovery, they 
say, will be W-shaped, and the market will re-collapse before any real boom can be-
gin. This recession, they warn, is nasty and likely to linger for years.5 
 
Looking Forward 
 
Regardless of who is right, though, there is something fundamentally wrong with the 
debate itself. The current news may be good or bad, revealing or misleading – but, 
then, investors aren’t supposed to take their cue from the current news in the first 
place.  
To trade assets on the basis of today’s statistics is to be backward looking. It is to 
be retrospective rather than predictive, to react rather than initiate, to trail rather than 
lead. It puts investors at the tail end of social dynamics. 
Needless to say, such behavior is entirely improper. According to the sacred an-
nals of modern finance, formalized a century ago by Irving Fisher (1907) and popu-
larized during the Great Depression by Benjamin Graham and David Dodd (1934), 
asset prices are forward looking: “The value of a common stock,” dictate Graham and 
Dodd in their immortal doorstopper, “depends entirely upon what it will earn in the 
future” (p. 309). 
These lines were written against the backdrop of the 1920s. The roaring stock 
market and the accompanying optimism ushered in by the end of the First World 
War offered a fertile breeding ground for what Graham and Dodd called the “New-
Era Theory,” especially in the land of limitless possibilities. The principles of dis-
counting the future gained adherents, and soon enough past profits became passé. 
They no longer mattered for the stock market. From now on, declared the gurus of 
finance, one should view the markets “from the standpoint of eternity, rather than 
                                                 
4 “A long-unheard phrase was on the lips of many equity traders during this week’s market 
rally – panic buying. Even after two months of steady gains for stocks, there were few signs of 
investor fatigue – indeed, the overriding sense was the fear of being left behind. . . . ‘You could 
say there was an element of panic about it – there were a lot of underweight players driving the 
market higher out there,’ said Tony Betts, senior sales trader at CMC Markets in London. ‘We 
clearly reached a situation where the bears felt they had suffered enough punishment’” 
(Shellock 2009). 
5 In the second half of 2009, while the market was still booming, prophet-of-doom Nouriel 
Roubini, whose claim to fame comes from accurately predicting the recent crisis, listed no less 
than seven reasons why the ongoing recovery was likely to be U-shaped rather than V-shaped, 
and two additional reasons why it might end up being W-shaped, accompanied by either defla-
tion or stagflation (Roubini 2009). With the 2010 onset of the Euro crisis, his pessimism has 
been reproduced and amplified by numerous other experts. 
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day-to-day” (Benjamin Graham quoted in Zweig 2009). Looking forward, the only 
thing that counted was the future trend of earnings.6 
It should be noted, though, that initially this approach didn’t win too many sup-
porters. In fact, it faced a rather stiff opposition, and not for naught. The late nine-
teenth century gave birth to a new entity: the modern, publicly traded corporation. It 
was an entirely novel way of organizing business, both inside and outside the firm, 
and it spread very quickly, carried on a tidal wave of public offerings. Forward-
looking securities of every color, size and denomination were being floated in ever 
larger numbers, all promising a future of riches to the daringly prescient, and the 
sheer magnitude and exponential growth of it all left economists baffled and public 
officials gasping for air.  
At the time, there were very few theoretical tools and scarcely any data to make 
sense of this new development. There was no corporate transparency to speak of, no 
models to predict future earnings, let alone their trend, and no formal methods to 
assess risk. To make matters worse, the newspapers were only too happy to amplify 
the forward-looking exploits of corporate promoters. The key owners and their bank-
ers were blamed, not without cause, for “overcapitalizing” their assets and “water-
ing” their stocks relative to their “actual” (read greenfield) investments – all in order 
to rip off the innocent public.7 
The whole thing smelled of a racket: “the principle that capitalization should be 
based on earning capacity rather than on actual cost,” declared one disgruntled rejec-
tionist, “is not only unsound in theory but is also vicious in its practical application” 
(Bonbright 1921: 482). Under these conditions, officials and theorists were unsure of 
how to reconcile the new practice of discounted future earnings with the familiar 
“par value.” It seemed much easier to stick to the conservative principles of “histori-
cal cost” accounting.  
In retrospect, though, these were futile acts of resistance. Forward-looking fi-
nance was not a mere technical gismo. It was the basis for a totally new architecture 
of power: capitalization. As noted, capitalization is a symbolic financial entity, a ritual 
that the capitalists use to discount to present value risk-adjusted expected future earn-
ings. This ritual has a very long history. It was first invented in the capitalist bourgs 
of Europe, probably sometime during the fourteenth century. It overcame religious 
opposition to usury in the seventeenth century, to become, for the first time, a con-
ventional practice among bankers. And its mathematical formulae, previously rely-
ing on habit and rules of thumb, were first rigorously developed and synthesized in 
the mid-nineteenth century by a group of German foresters. But it was only in the 
                                                 
6 Graham and Dodd were very critical of the early “New-Era Theory.” They thought it was 
dangerously optimistic and logically incomplete, and that it had to be supplemented by proper 
valuation, cool-headed research and sufficient diversification. But they wholly endorsed the 
theory’s most important feature: the need to look forward.  
7 This early financial history is told with great insight and much fanfare in Matthew Joseph-
son’s classic tale of The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1861-1901 (1934). 
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late nineteenth century, with the birth of the publicly-traded modern corporation, 
that these principles were poised to become the broad norm of what we now call 
modern finance.8 
 
Capitalization: Marx’s Fiction 
 
Karl Marx, one of the first to dissect the social underpinnings of capitalization, sided 
with the rejectionists. The capitalist system, he said, fancies two different entities: 
“actual” capital and “illusionary” or “fictitious” capital. The driving force of the sys-
tem is actual capital, which exists as commodities. For Marx, actual capital comprises 
means of production, work in progress and commodity money, whose prices are gov-
erned by the reality of labor time, whether historical or current. By contrast, fictitious 
capital is an ownership claim on future earnings, an illusionary entity whose price is the 
present value of those earnings.9  
According to Marx, the latter entity is fictitious for three separate reasons. First, 
the ownership claim on earnings often has no “actual” principal to call on, as is the 
case with state debt, for instance. Second, the claim extends into the uncertain future: 
it capitalizes expected earnings, and these could easily fail to materialize. Third and 
finally, discounting depends on the rate of interest, which means that the same flow 
of earnings can give rise to many different levels of capitalization (Marx 1909, Vol. 3: 
546-47 and 550-51).  
For Marx, then, actual and fictitious capitals are totally different creatures. They 
consist of different entities, and they are quantified through different processes – the 
former via past and current productive labor time, the latter through future earnings 
expectations and the rate of interest. So, when considered separately, their respective 
magnitudes and movements need have nothing in common. The problem, though, is 
that they cannot be considered separately. The capitalist system is denominated in 
prices, and as Marx himself conceded, prices are affected by both fictitious and actual 
accumulation. As a result, any divergence of the former from the latter is bound to 
“distort” the value system: 
 
All connection with the actual process of self expansion of capital is thus lost 
to the last vestige, and the conception of capital as something which expands 
itself automatically is thereby strengthened. . . . The accumulation of the 
wealth of this class [the large moneyed capitalists] may proceed in a direction 
very different from actual accumulation. . . . Moreover, everything appears 
turned upside down here, since no real prices and their real basis appear in this 
                                                 
8 For a critical historical and theoretical analysis of capitalization, along with an outline of its 
role as the capitalist architecture of power, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Part III).  
9 “The forming of a fictitious capital,” writes Marx, “is called capitalising. Every periodically 
repeated income is capitalised by calculating it on the average rate of interest, as an income 
which would be realised by a capital at this rate of interest” (1909, Vol. 3: 548). 
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paper world, but only bullion, metal coin, notes, bills of exchange, securities. 
Particularly in the centers, in which the whole money business of the country 
is crowded together, like London, this reversion becomes apparent; the entire 
process becomes unintelligible” (Marx 1909, Vol. 3: 549, 561 and 576, emphases 
added).  
 
These considerations led Marx – and many Marxists since – to view the “illusion” 
of capitalization as antithetical to the “real” essence of value and accumulation, and 
therefore as offering only secondary insight into the larger analysis of capitalism.10 The 
seemingly independent gyrations of fictitious capital of course could be hugely impor-
tant, and in recent years Marxists have put increasing effort into their analysis. But this 
importance is mostly negative and temporally limited. In the short run, capitalization 
wreaks havoc: it contaminates the underlying system of labor values, it sends false sig-
nals, and it amplifies the underlying economic cycle with an even more violent finan-
cial cycle that oscillates between euphoric bubbles and deflationary crashes. In the long 
run, though, it is the “real” economy of production, not the nominal “fiction” of fi-
nance, that counts. Production is the Galtonian anchor, the historical trend from which 
finance deviates and to which it must eventually revert. And since the key to capitalist 
development remains a proper understanding of the labor process, the extraction of 
surplus value and the accumulation of actual capital, Marxists never felt they needed to 
develop their own unique theory of capitalization, let alone to place such a theory at 
the heart of their analysis.  
 
Capitalization: The Neoclassical Reconstruction 
 
This later task was taken on by the liberals. Contrary to the Marxists, who begin from 
two different entities, the neoclassicists start from equivalence: capitalization both de-
rives from and reflects the actual capital goods. One of the first stylized expressions of 
this symmetry is due to Irving Fisher. In an article aptly titled “What is Capital?” 
(1896), Fisher opens by devising a consistent set of definitions. His starting point is a 
distinction between “stock” (quantity at a point in time) and “flow” (quantity per unit 
                                                 
10 For a careful reconstruction and extension of Marx’s analysis of capitalization, see Perelman 
(1990). Subsequent Marxist approaches to finance include Rudolf Hilferding’s notion of fi-
nance capital, which focuses on the institutional and political takeover of industry by financial 
interests and on the accompanied authoritarian transformation of domestic and foreign policy 
(Hilferding 1910); Baran and Sweezy’s notion of finance as a form of absorbing the rising sur-
plus of industry (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Foster 2007); and the view of Arrighi and others 
who speak about the transition from industry to finance and on the so-called process of finan-
cialization that eviscerates the productive base of society (Arrighi 1994; Williams et al. 2000; 
Froud et al. 2002; Epstein 2005; Krippner 2005). These interpretations, although different in 
their details, share one key assumption: they all presume the existence of “true” productive 
capital – an entity from which the monetary appearance of finance deviates and which it dis-
torts. 
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of time). Capital is a stock; income is a flow. Capital gives rise to income, whereas in-
come gives capital its value. The precise correspondence between these concepts is ar-
ticulated in his book The Rate of Interest (1907):  
 
The statement that “capital produces income” is true only in the physical 
sense; it is not true in the value sense. That is to say, capital-value does not pro-
duce income-value. On the contrary, income-value produces capital-value. . . . 
[W]hen capital and income are measured in value, their causal connection is 
the reverse of that which holds true when they are measured in quantity. The 
orchard produces the apples; but the value of the apples produces the value 
of the orchard. . . . We see, then, that present capital-wealth produces future 
income-services, but future income-value produces present capital-value. (13–
14, original emphases)  
 
The feedback loop is illustrated in the Table 1, adopted from Fisher (14): 
 
Table 1 
Fisher’s House of Mirrors 
 
 PRESENT CAPITAL  FUTURE INCOME 
QUANTITIES capital wealth   income services 
     
VALUES capital value    income value 
 
Explanation: In the material world, depicted by step 1 of the sequence, capital 
wealth (measured by the physical quantity of capital goods) produces future income 
services (similarly measured by their physical quantity). In the nominal world, de-
picted by step 3, the income value of the future services (measured in dollars) is dis-
counted by the prevailing rate of interest to generate the present value of capital (also 
measured in dollars). The two worlds are connected through step 2, whereby the 
physical quantity of future income services determines their dollar price.  
Hypothetical numerical illustration: Intel has 10 million units of capital wealth, 
which, during its future life, will produce 1 billion units of income services in the 
form of microchip-generated utils (step 1). These 1 billion utils’ worth of services, 
spread over the life of the capital wealth, will fetch 100 billion dollars’ worth of fu-
ture profits and interest (step 2), which in turn are discounted to 50 billion dollars’ 
worth of capital value (step 3). 
From a theoretical standpoint, this articulation is deeply problematic – primarily 
because neoclassical “capital goods,” much like Marx’s “actual capital,” cannot be 
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measured in universal units, whether we call them utils or abstract labor hours.11 But 
this difficulty hardly deterred the neoclassicists. At stake here was the wholesale con-
version of capitalism to a new, financial footing, and the articulations offered by 
Fisher and other liberal economists provided the detailed rituals on which this new 
capitalized structure were to stand from then to eternity. 
 
Dominant Ideology 
  
And, indeed, liberals soon began to believe, first, that any expected income flow can 
be discounted to present value; second, that, in addition to earnings, discounting re-
flects both the normal rate of return and the risks specific to the income in question; 
and finally, that capitalization applies universally across time and space. Now, since 
in capitalism every process has a potential impact on the flow of income, it follows 
that accumulation, seen through the spectacles of capitalization, incorporates, at 
least potentially, every aspect of social life. From this viewpoint, capital is no longer a 
narrow matter of economics – or, alternatively, everything is now a matter of fi-
nance. Whatever affects the future trend of earnings, risk and the normal rate of re-
turn can be capitalized; and once capitalized it becomes part of capital. 
And so a new comprehensive ethic was born. What Marx dismissed as a fiction, 
and what early twentieth-century liberals considered a rip-off, became the new tem-
plate for creordering capitalist power. By the middle of the twentieth century, the for-
ward-looking notion that asset prices discount the deep future had replaced “actual 
cost” as the new creed. In the 1950s, capitalization started to appear in finance text-
books; in the 1960s and 1970s, it helped propagate portfolio theory and took over 
corporate budgeting; in the 1980s and 1990s, it was underwriting the worldwide 
spread of neoliberalism and the tenfold increase in global stock prices; and by the 
2000s, it was safely established as a sacrosanct gospel, an organized belief system 
with more followers than all of the world’s religions combined.  
The rituals of this forward-looking gospel are now articulated, published and re-
published in millions of learned papers and monographs, and reproduced endlessly 
in finance textbooks. They are deeply embedded in computer models and are hard-
wired into pocket calculators. Every accountant, analyst and capitalist accepts them 
as an article of faith; most politicians and government officials are conditioned to 
follow their dictates; and the remainder of humanity – from employees and small 
business owners, through pensioners and the unemployed, to criminals and illegal 
aliens – unknowingly obeys their decree. Encompassing, imposing and largely be-
yond dispute, forward-looking capitalization has become the heart and center of to-
day’s dominant ideology. 
 
                                                 
11 The notion of abstract labor was first articulated by Marx (1859). The term util was coined 
by Fisher (1892). For a review and critique of both concepts, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: 
Ch. 8). 
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The Puzzle 
 
Now, turning from this broad discussion back to the current historical moment, a 
puzzle arises: if asset prices look forward to the long-term future trend of earnings, 
why worry about the ongoing economic cycle, however volatile?  
Every investor is conditioned to know that crises come and go with remarkable 
regularity and that recession always gives way to expansion, so what’s the point of 
following the latest news on green shoots, commodity prices, or the actions and inac-
tions of purchasing managers and policy makers? Although these immediate news 
items may be important for journalists, politicians and even economists, their impact 
on the long-term trajectory of profit is negligible – so why should they be of any con-
cern to dominant capitalists and their prescient strategists? 
The short answer is that, normally, the latter indeed don’t seem to care. But 
there are crucial exceptions to this rule. And in order to understand both the excep-
tions and the rule from which they deviate, we need first to step back and examine 
the historical record. 
 
The Great Divide 
 
Consider Figure 2, which shows the relationship between the dollar price and dollar 
earnings per share of the S&P 500, a group representing the largest listed corpora-
tions in the United States.12 
The chart contains two sets of monthly series. The top set, starting in January 
1871, displays the actual levels of the series. The price series is calculated as the 
monthly average of daily closings. The earnings-per-share series is computed in two 
steps: first by interpolating monthly earnings from annual data (before 1926) and 
from quarterly data (after 1926); and then by expressing the result as a 12-month 
moving average. In the chart, both series are normalized, with September 1929=100, 
and are plotted against the left logarithmic scale to facilitate visual inspection.13  
The bottom set, beginning in December 1874, shows the respective rates of 
change of the top series. The series are calculated, first, by computing for each month 
the percent growth rate relative to the same month a year earlier, and then by 
smoothing the resulting data as a three-year moving average (so that each observa-
tion shows the average annual growth rate of the last 36 months). The resulting series 
are plotted against the right-hand arithmetic scale.  
                                                 
12 The S&P 500 index splices the following three series: the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Com-
posite (1871–1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926–1957); and the S&P 500 (1957–present). 
13 A logarithmic scale amplifies the variations of a series when its values are small and 
compresses these variations when the values are large (note that the numbers on the scale 
jump by multiples of 10). It also has the convenient feature that the slope of a series is 
proportionate to its temporal rate of change. These two properties make a logarithmic scale 
particularly suitable to visualizing exponential growth.  
- 12 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BICHLER AND NITZAN 
 
Figure 2 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1871-2010 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Monthly earnings are interpolated 
from annual data before 1926 and from quarterly data after 1926. 
Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing prices. Both 
series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with September 
1929=100. The last data points are March 2010 for earnings per 
share and May 2010 for price.  
  
SOURCE: Robert Shiller 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, retrieved 
on May 20, 2010).  
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Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two growth rate 
series (smoothed as three-year moving averages). The coefficient, which quantifies 
the co-movement of the series, is measured separately for the periods before and after 
1917, as well as for four sub-periods that make up the post-1917 era.14 The rationale 
for delineating between the different periods is explained in what follows. 
 
Table 2 
S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the 
Annual Rates of Growth of Price and Earnings per Share 
(Monthly data expressed as 3-year moving Averages) 
 
 
PERIOD 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
Jan 1873 – Oct 1917 + 0.72 
Oct 1917 – Mar 2010 + 0.35 
 Oct 1917 – Dec 1929 + 0.29 
 Dec 1929 – Feb 1939 + 0.89 
 Feb 1939 – Sep 2000 – 0.15 
Su
b 
pe
rio
ds
 
 Sep 2000 – Mar 2010 + 0.64 
 
 
SOURCE: Figure 2. 
 
If we take a bird’s-eye view of the entire period from 1871 to 2010, equity prices 
seem to have moved more or less together with earnings per share. But from a 
shorter perspective, there is a great divide between the periods before and after the 
First World War.  
During the period ending in 1917, which the figure shades for easier visualiza-
tion, the correlation between the two series is very high. The fit is evident in the tight 
co-movement of the levels of price and earnings per share (top series) and even more 
so in their almost identical rates of change (bottom set). Between 1873 and 1917, the 
Pearson correlation between the latter series was +0.72, and this tight fit shouldn’t 
surprise us.15 
Recall that during that period, forward-looking finance was still in its infancy, 
and that investors were conditioned to believe that “what you see is what you get.” 
According to Graham and Dodd, the investment outlook was largely conservative, 
and most stock owners tended to view common equities as little more than glorified 
bonds. The main reason for holding equity was dividends – which, at the time, were 
                                                 
14 The Pearson correlation coefficient ranges between +1 and –1. A value of +1 denotes perfect 
positive correlation, 0 denotes no correlation and –1 denotes perfect negative correlation. 
15 Note that until 1926, monthly earning data are interpolated from annual rather than 
quarterly reports, which probably serves to force down the measured correlation. 
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free of any taxes and accounted, on average, for 70% of corporate profits (compared 
with less than 50% in the second half of the twentieth century and about 45% since 
the mid 1970s).16 There were of course those who bought stocks with an eye to future 
capital gains, but these were considered “speculators,” not “investors.” For the latter, 
the main criteria for choosing stocks were: (1) stable dividends; (2) a somewhat 
higher level of earnings to support such dividends and maintain the company; and 
(3) a stock price that was solidly backed by so-called tangible assets.17  
Like the interest on bonds, corporate earnings and dividends were not expected 
to trend upwards; although investors would have welcomed such an increase, the 
common premise was that both streams would remain solidly stable. And since the 
ownership of equities, like the ownership of bonds, was supposed to generate a fairly 
constant yield, equity prices tended to fluctuate closely with current corporate earn-
ings and dividends – which is more or less what we see in Figure 2.  
The second period, though, from 1917 onward, is completely different. For the 
most part, the fit between price and earnings per share is very loose and often nega-
tive: the variations of the series are usually out of sync, the magnitudes of the varia-
tions are often very different, and there are extended periods during which the num-
bers move in opposite directions. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the growth-
rate series over the entire post-1917 period (including the anomalous 1930s and 
2000s) is a mere +0.35 – less than half of its pre-1917 level.  
Of course, theorists of finance don’t consider this decoupling problematic. On 
the contrary, they see it as a vindication of their forward-looking model, clear evi-
dence that capitalist finance has finally come into its own.  
 
Decoupling Price from Earnings 
 
According to the modern forward-looking habitus, investors price an asset by dis-
counting the future profit trend that the asset is expected to generate. In this ritual, 
the participants set the price of the asset – say a share of Microsoft – as equal to the 
ratio between what they expect Microsoft’s future profits to be on the one hand and 
the rate of return they wish those profits to represent on the other. For instance, if 
investors expect ownership of a Microsoft share to generate a fixed annual profit 
stream of $100 in perpetuity, and if they want this stream to represent a 20% rate of 
return, then they would be willing to pay for the share (or demand to be paid) a price 
of $500. We can represent this computation symbolically, so that:  
 
1. 500$
2.0
100$
===
r
E
K t , 
                                                 
16 Computed from data in Robert Shiller’s website, retrieved on May 20, 2010: 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls. 
17 For more on the beliefs, rituals and behavior of equity investors before the First World War, 
see the summary in Graham and Dodd (1934: Ch. XXVII). 
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where Kt is the price of Microsoft’s share in year t, E is the level of annual earnings 
investors expect Microsoft to generate in perpetuity, and r is the decimal rate of re-
turn appropriate for Microsoft. 
Now, given the common belief that capitalism is a perpetual growth system, it 
seems only reasonable to expect Microsoft’s annual earnings to flow not at a fixed 
rate E, but at a rate that grows over time. This expectation could easily be fit into the 
framework by substituting a higher fixed level of earnings for the exponentially grow-
ing one. Alternatively, if we assume, as investors habitually do, that the expected 
growth of earnings will be maintained indefinitely at a rate g, say 10%, and provided 
that this growth rate is lower than the discount rate r, Microsoft’s share price can be 
computed as follows:18 
 
2.  000,1$
1.02.0
100$
=
−
=
−
=
gr
E
K t  
 
In general, the practical pricing process can be far more intricate, but the basic 
ritual of contrasting expected profits with a discount rate of return is always pre-
sent.19 Now, regardless of the merits of this ritual, one thing seems obvious: prices set 
in this manner should bear little or no relationship to the current level of profit.  
There are three reasons for the dissociation. First, since the price reflects the fu-
ture trend of earnings, and since this trend is affected only marginally, if at all, by 
present or past earnings, there is no inherent reason why month-to-month fluctua-
tions in current profits should affect stock prices. And that is just for starters. Note 
that the future earnings trend, by its very nature, cannot be known with certainty and 
is forever conjectural. For this reason, investors discount not the profits they will 
earn, but the profits they expect to earn. In the case of Equation 1 above, for example, 
investors can easily misjudge the perpetual future flow of Microsoft’s earnings per 
share to be $50 or $400 instead of the eventual $100; this error will in turn cause 
them to price the company’s stock at $250 or $2000, respectively (=50/0.2 or 
400/0.2). Similarly, if investors erroneously predict that Microsoft’s earnings will 
grow annually by 1% or 19% instead of the eventual 10%, they will misprice its stock 
at $526 or $10,000, respectively. And since profit expectations are rather open ended 
and commonly hyped either positively or negatively, the effect is to widen further the 
                                                 
18 For the mathematical derivation of Equation 2, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: 153-155) or 
consult any text on infinite series. As noted, Equation 2 holds only if the rate of growth of 
earnings g is lower than the rate of interest r. Otherwise, we get the Bernoullian Petersburg 
Paradox: the price becomes infinite (if g = r) or negative (if g > r), the ritual breaks down, and 
the equation has to be patched with auxiliary assumptions (for the first systematic account of 
this annoying glitch, see Durand 1957).  
19 For a detailed political economy of discounting, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Ch. 11). 
- 16 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BICHLER AND NITZAN 
 
disparity between the movement of price on the one hand and of current earnings on 
the other. 
Second, a given level of expected earnings can generate any number of asset 
prices, depending on the discount rate of return. For instance, if the discount rate in 
Equation 1 were 10% (rather than 20%), the stock price would double to $1,000 
(=$100/0.1). Now, the discount rate changes constantly – partly because of varia-
tions in the overall rate of interest and partly in response to changing perceptions of 
risk specific to the particular equity in question. However, since in and of themselves 
these changes are unrelated to current earnings, the effect is to reduce the correlation 
further.  
Finally, investors are not always able to follow the rituals of finance with suffi-
cient precision. Regardless of how hard they try, their computations are constantly 
thrown off, or so we are told, by various market “imperfections,” government “inter-
vention” and other such diseases; and sometimes, particularly when investors get 
overly excited, the calculations can even become “irrational.” Now, since neither the 
miscalculations nor the irrationality are correlated with current profits, the result is to 
loosen the fit even more.  
So if we adhere to the scriptures of modern finance, we should expect to see no 
systematic association between equity prices and current profits. And given that most 
if not all present-day investors obey the scriptures – including the allowed imperfec-
tions and irrationalities – their actions tend to validate the “theory.”  
But not always.  
 
Looking Backward 
 
Figure 2 and Table 2 show two clear exceptions to the rule: the first occurred during 
the 1930s, the second during the 2000s. In both periods, which Figure 2 shades for 
easier visualization, equity prices moved together – and tightly so – with current earn-
ings. Between 1929 and 1939, the correlation between the respective growth rates of 
the two series (smoothed as 3-year moving averages) was +0.89, while in the period 
between 2000 and 2010 it was +0.64. The difference with the rest of the post-1917 
period is stark: in the period from 1917 to 1929 the correlation was a much lower 
+0.29; and in the period from 1939 to 2000 the correlation was –0.15 – which means 
that the series had very limited co-movement, and that the limited relationship that 
did exist was actually negative. 
Needless to say, the tight positive correlation of the 1930s and the 2000s, remi-
niscent of a bygone era, is a gross violation of modern forward-looking finance. In 
fact, the violation is worse than it seems. Note that, despite their name, monthly 
earnings per share represent profits that were earned not during the current month, 
but during the previous twelve months. This measurement convention means that, 
during the 1930s, and again during the 2000s, investors committed a cardinal sin. 
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They priced assets based not on future earnings, and not even on current earnings, 
but on past earnings! 
What caused this sharp departure from conventional practice? Why would inves-
tors regress to a backward-looking posture that the scientists of finance tell them is 
patently “false”? Why would they suddenly abandon their convenient forward-
looking ceremony and instead take their cue from the dead past? Why give up the 
predictive powers of precise positivism in favor of poor historicism?  
A naïve observer, unschooled in the rituals of modern finance, may be tempted 
to blame such regression on the heightened turbulence of the two periods. According 
to this view, investors are always forward looking. But when rattled by crisis, they 
become more cautious about the future, and that greater caution causes them to use 
the movement of current earnings as an indication of heightened future risk. As a 
result, increases in current earnings mitigate risk perceptions; lower risk perceptions 
reduce the discount rate; and a lower discount rate raises stock prices (and vice 
versa). 
This type of behavior, although possible, would be entirely inconsistent with the 
basic ritual of forward-looking asset pricing. First, according to this ritual, the level of 
caution – or the “risk premium” embedded in the discount rate (r) of Equations 1 
and 2 – is a slowly-changing magnitude. It reflects the overall price volatility of the 
assets – historically as well as with an eye to the future – and as such, it changes very 
little from year to year. Second, in the manuals of modern finance the “risk pre-
mium” pertains to the volatility not of earnings (E), but of prices (Kt). This association 
means that even if the risk premium were to exhibit large temporal variations, still 
there would be no reason for such variations to track the ups and downs of current 
earnings. 
So what is behind the two reversals? 
 
Systemic Fear 
 
In our view, the reason is systemic fear.  
Systemic fear is a class of its own. It has little to do with the periodic down-
swings that make capitalists cautious, and it has no connection to the dread and ap-
prehension that regularly puncture their habitual greed. “Business as usual” is always 
uncertain, and with capitalism constantly in flux, investors are forever fearful about 
profit and wary about risk: they are concerned that earnings may not rise as quickly 
as they hope, or that they might fall; that volatility will increase; that interest rates 
will rise; and so on.  
But these fears, no matter how intense, are self-contained. They pertain to the 
level and pattern of profit, not to its existence. They do not impinge on the normality 
of profit – i.e., on the belief that assets have a “natural” tendency to grow and that 
capitalists have the power and right to enforce and appropriate such expansion. And 
most crucially, they reflect the belief that expected profits, whether high or low, 
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could always be priced to their present value. Regardless of the market’s ups and 
downs, the underlying assumption is that the capitalization process itself – the ritual 
that creorders modern capitalism and anchors its dominant ideology – will remain 
intact.  
Occasionally, though, there arises a very different and far deeper type of fear: the 
terrifying thought that the entity of profit – and, worse still, the very institution of 
capitalization on which the entire capitalist megamachine stands – might cease to 
exist.20 This latter fear is associated with systemic crisis – that is, with periods during 
which the very future of capitalism is put into question. It is what Hegel meant when he 
spoke of the bondsman’s “fear of death”: 
  
For this consciousness [of the capitalist bound to the steering wheel of a 
megamachine gone wild] was not in peril and fear for this element or that 
[such as falling profit or rising volatility], nor for this or that moment of time 
[like a sharp market correction or a declaration of war], it was afraid for its 
entire being; it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master [the ultimate wrath of 
the ruled]. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trem-
bled throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has 
quaked within it [will capitalism survive?]. (Hegel 1807: 237) 
 
The first time capitalists were gripped by such systemic terror was during the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The second time is during the present crisis, a pro-
tracted turbulence that started in the early 2000s and is still ongoing.  
 
The 1930s 
  
Let’s examine each of these periods more closely, beginning with the 1930s.  
Figure 3 “magnifies” the data from Figure 2. It focuses specifically on the period 
from the late 1910s to the early 1950s, with the shaded area denoting the period of 
systemic crisis. For ease of comparison, the two top series are rebased with October 
1929=100 and plotted against an arithmetic left scale. The rate-of-growth series, as 
before, are plotted against the arithmetic right scale. 
The data show that, after the First World War and during the happy 1920s, stock 
prices moved rather independently of earnings, exactly as the “New-Era Theory” 
decreed. But once the stock market crashed in 1929 and the Great Depression began, 
the “New-Era Theory” broke down: the two series, instead of moving independently 
of each other, suddenly converged and remained tightly locked for nearly a decade.  
 
                                                 
20 The concept of the megamachine was invented and articulated by Lewis Mumford (1967; 
1970). Its relevance to capitalism is developed in Nitzan (1998) and Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009a: Ch. 12). 
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Figure 3 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1917-1952 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Monthly earnings are interpolated 
from annual data before 1926 and from quarterly data after 1926. 
Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing prices. Both 
series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with September 
1929=100.  
 
SOURCE: Robert Shiller (see Figure 2). 
 
Both series fell in tandem from 1930 to 1932, and then rose in tandem from 1933 
to 1936 – charting what initially looked like a V-shaped recovery. But the hopeful V 
soon became a disheartening W. In 1937, a new downturn began, and the two series, 
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which briefly decoupled, again converged in a free fall. It was only in 1939, after a 
decade of frustration, that the two series again diverged and that the “New-Era” 
theorists could breathe a sigh of relief.  
The political-economic background of the period requires little elaboration. Dur-
ing much of the 1930s, the United States, along with the rest of the world, was mired 
in a systemic crisis. The very existence of the capitalist mode of power was at stake, 
with liberalism fighting for its life against both communism and fascism. The domi-
nant ideology suffered a major blow. The “free market” didn’t seem to be working, 
and with laissez faire theories in deep disarray, the rulers were no longer confident in 
the obedience of the ruled. Few felt certain that capitalism would survive, and many 
– including some of the system’s leading advocates – feared its imminent demise.  
In this context, the “future trend of earnings” was no longer a very meaningful 
concept, and there was little point in extrapolating, let alone quantifying, its growth 
rate. Furthermore, the very institution of capitalization was put into question, so 
even if future earnings could somehow be predicted, it didn’t seem certain that future 
ownership claims on these earnings could be priced and transacted. 
There was no anchor ahead. All that was solid melted into air, all that was holy 
was profaned. And so, in despair, forward-looking investors found themselves latch-
ing onto the only “real” thing they could see: the past. Like the Aymara Indians of 
South America, they suddenly realized that the future was behind them.21 Nomi-
nally, their assets still represented a claim over the future; but the only way to price 
that future was to look backward, to what the assets had already earned.  
The pricing anomaly ended in 1939. Suddenly, the disorder dissipated, optimism 
re-emerged and history could again be forgotten. The onset of the Second World 
War and the boom that ensued sent profits soaring (they doubled in less than two 
years). And the capitalists, cajoled by the apparent efficacy of the new welfare-
warfare state, regained their systemic confidence. They abandoned the stale past, 
returned to their forward-looking rituals and resumed the discounting of expected 
future earnings. Within two years, the stock market was down 25%, but this decline 
was no longer symptomatic of systemic fear. On the contrary, it was evidence that 
capitalism had survived and that capitalists could fearlessly practice their capitaliza-
tion rituals. 
 
The 2000s 
 
This situation lasted for sixty years. During that period, capitalism went through 
many ups and downs, and there was the occasional scare that sent markets reeling. 
But none of the jolts was serious enough to evoke the Hegelian fear of death. At no 
                                                 
21 The Aymara language, spoken by Indians in Southern Peru and Northern Chile, reverses the 
directional-temporal order of most languages. It treats the known past as being “in front of us” 
and the unknown future as lying “behind us.” To test this inverted perception, just look up at 
the stars: ahead of you you’ll see nothing but the past (see Núñez and Sweetser 2006). 
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point was the existence of the system itself in doubt. It was business as usual, with 
greed and fear easily incorporated into future earnings projections and risk calcula-
tions. The financial model seemed to work like clockwork.  
But in 2000, the machine stopped. The threat of a new systemic crisis suddenly 
loomed large, and the specter of backward-looking pricing, having been dormant for 
decades, returned to haunt the markets. 
Figure 4 displays price and earnings per share data from 1970 to the present, 
with the shaded area denoting a period of systemic crisis. The two top series, denot-
ing levels, are rebased with December 2007=100 and graphed against the left arith-
metic scale. The bottom series express the annual rates of change (smoothed as 3-
year moving averages) and are plotted against the right arithmetic scale.  
As the data in Figure 2 and Figure 4 show, from 1939 to the early 2000s, both 
price and earnings per share trended upwards. But in line with the “New-Era The-
ory” – which by now had become mainstream finance – the short-term correlation 
between them remained loose and indeed negative (see Table 2). During that long 
stretch, earnings went through several sharp declines. For instance, during the end-
of-communism crisis of 1989-1991 they dropped 37%, and following the emerging 
markets scare of 1997-1998 they fell 6% – yet in both cases stock prices continued to 
soar. And conversely, in 1972-1974 earnings increased by 42% while prices dropped 
by 43%; similarly, at the end of 1987 earnings increased by 14% while prices dropped 
by 27%. All in all, then, investors seemed perfectly happy to obey the theory. 
Throughout the period, they ignored the ephemeral present in favor of the eternal 
future.  
But in 2000, they suddenly lost their forward-looking vision, and they haven’t 
regained it since. Over the past decade, earnings have experienced two very violent 
swings; yet stock prices, instead of remaining impartial to the immediate gyrations of 
the earnings cycle, have traced it, and rather tightly: the correlation coefficient be-
tween the rates of growth series, smoothed as 3-years moving averages, jumped to 
+0.64, up from to –0.15 in the preceding six decades.  
A fairly similar picture arises at the global level. Figure 5 shows price and earn-
ings per share for the Datastream world equity index, covering the period between 
January 1973 and April 2010 (there are no prior data). The top series, plotted against 
the left logarithmic scale, show levels and are rebased with January 1986=100. The 
bottom series show the annual rates of change, smoothed as a three-year moving 
averages, and are plotted against the right arithmetic scale. As before, the shaded 
area denotes a period of systemic crisis.  
Because the world aggregate is far broader than the U.S. one, reflecting many 
different markets that often move through different phases and that are subject to 
different conditions, one would expect the correlation between the two series to be 
looser throughout. But it is not. For the period from January 1974 to August 2000, 
the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two rate-of-growth series, smoothed 
as 3-year moving average, is –0.16, which is similar to that of the U.S. And the coef-
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ficient for the subsequent period is +0.48 – lower than U.S.’s +0.64, but still far too 
high for the forward-looking ritual.  
 
Figure 4 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1970-2010 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Monthly earnings are interpolated 
from quarterly data. Stock price data are monthly averages of daily 
closing prices. Both series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with 
December 2007=100. The last data points are March 2010 for earn-
ings per share and May 2010 for price.  
 
SOURCE: Robert Shiller (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 5 
World Equities: Price and Earnings per Share, 1973-2010 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Indices denote month-end closing prices. They are ex-
pressed in $U.S. and rebased with January 1986=100. Earnings per 
share denote net profits per share earned in the previous twelve 
months The last data points are for April 30, 2010. 
 
SOURCE: Datastream (series codes: TOTMKWD(PI) for the 
stock market index; TOTMKWD(PE) for earnings per share).  
 
 
Is Capitalization Approaching a Glass Ceiling? 
 
Let’s examine the experience of the past decade more closely, beginning with the first 
market cycle, which started to decline in 2000, troughed in 2003 and peaked in 2008 
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(given the similar statistical patterns in Figure 4 and Figure 5, our discussion refers to 
the former figure only). The 2000 “dotcom” crash and the demise of the “new econ-
omy,” together with the 2001 collapse of the Twin Towers and the onset of the “infi-
nite war on terror,” signaled the beginning of a new era of uncertainty. Analysts 
started to debate the end of the “Washington Consensus,” strategists deliberated over 
the decline of the “American Empire,” and culturalists lamented the death of the 
“global village.”  
It is true that, initially, nobody was seriously contemplating the “end of capital-
ism.” But capitalists nonetheless started to grow wary. This didn’t feel like yet an-
other “crisis as usual,” and the long-term trajectory of future profits – which in previ-
ous decades had appeared neatly bounded and relatively easy to project – suddenly 
looked murky. And so, once again, capitalists found themselves with their backs to 
the future. As we can see in Figure 4, instead of projecting the earning trend looking 
forward, they began to watch earnings as they unfolded and to discount their past 
declines.  
By the middle of 2002, the earnings crisis finally appeared to have ended, and in 
early 2003 the stock market bottomed. Profits staged a massive, V-shaped recovery 
and, over the next five years, rose by nearly 350%. And yet, despite the surge, capi-
talists still found the future hard to envisage. The earnings boom certainly was real 
enough – but so were its limits.  
These limits become visible when we take a bird’s eye view of the postwar pe-
riod. During that period, U.S. market capitalization was fueled by a highly favorable 
combination of several power processes.22 First, after the Great Depression, capital-
ists managed to force a systematic redistribution in their favor, seeing the combined 
share of their pretax profit and interest in national income rise from about 12% in the 
1930s and 1940s to roughly 17% in the 2000s. Second, they also succeeded in push-
ing down the effective corporate tax rate – from 55% in the 1940s to less than 30% in 
the 2000s – a decline that caused their after-tax corporate earnings to increase even 
further. Third, the broader consolidation of power relations and the establishment of 
capital-friendly regulations and macro stabilization policies helped them reduce earn-
ing volatility – and, by extension, their own perceptions of risk. This decline in per-
ceived risk, along with the general fall in interest rates since the late 1970s, lowered 
the rate at which they discount their expected earnings, thereby boosting their pre-
sent value even more.  
These power processes all had the same impact on the stock market: they pushed 
it up. The effect of income redistribution and falling corporate taxes convinced capi-
talists that net profits would continue to rise much faster than national income, while 
falling risk perception along with the drop in interest rates over the past thirty years 
allowed them to re-price this steep earning trend at ever lower discount rates. The net 
                                                 
22 The argument in the remainder of this section highlights long-term themes that we are 
currently developing for a forthcoming publication. 
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consequence was that the overall stock market capitalization rose more than four times 
faster than the gross national income: it soared from $167 billion in 1952 to $20.3 tril-
lion in 2007 – a 127-fold increase – compared with a mere 39-fold increase in dollar 
value of gross national income, which grew from $312 billion to $12.4 trillion.23,24  
The trouble was that, by the early 2000s, after half a century in overdrive, these 
power processes have already run much of their course, making future increases in 
stock prices more difficult to achieve. Capitalism is inherently conflictual, so power 
is always imposed against opposition. This built-in conflict means that from a certain 
point onward, there tends to be a positive relationship between the existing level of 
capitalist power on the one hand, and the force that needs to be exerted in order to 
further increase that power on the other. Thus, the higher the income inequality, the 
harder it is to make it more unequal; the lower the corporate tax rate, the harder it is 
to cut it further; the smaller the volatility of earnings, the harder it is to stabilize them 
further; and the lower the rate of interest, the harder it is to see it fall further.  
The exhaustion of these redistributional/conflictual fuels left the stock market at 
the mercy of aggregate growth – and yet the “real economy” too seemed to be run-
ning into the sand.25 Expressed in purchasing power parity, annual GDP growth in 
the United States has drifted downwards, from 3.6% in the period from 1950 to 1975 
to 3.1% since then, while world GDP growth dropped from 4.7% to 3.5%.26 Since 
the late 1990s, official growth measures seemed to have recovered, leading capitalists 
to hype the unlimited potential of “high technology” and the “knowledge economy,” 
along with the fabulous riches promised by rapid urbanization in the so-called 
“emerging markets.” But by the early 2000s, these hopes were increasingly spoiled by 
new doomsday scenarios, ranging from “peak oil” and “climate tipping” to “run-
away pandemics” and “environmental devastation” (scenarios that we consider later 
in the paper).  
The fact that redistributional difficulties tend to arise together with overall stag-
nation is no accident. In order to redistribute income and assets in their favor, rulers 
need to exert their power on the rest of society; to exert such power, they have to 
strategically limit and partly sabotage the well-being of the underlying population; 
                                                 
23 Note that market capitalization can also increase due to the public listing of new or 
previously private firms, and that this increase is independent of the overall income of 
capitalists. The overall effect on capitalization of new listings was positive till the late 1970s, 
but with massive buybacks since then, the impact has become negative (Nitzan 1996). 
24 The data for equity market capitalization are net of foreign holdings by U.S. citizens and are 
taken from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board (FL893064105 for market capitalization; 
FL263164003 for foreign equities held by U.S. citizens). Pretax corporate profits, interest, and 
the effective corporate tax rate are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
25 We use inverted commas to highlight our objection to the theoretical notion and empirical 
measurements of the so-called “real economy.” However, since capitalists take the concepts 
and measurements of the real economy for granted, we refer to them here “as is.” For a critical 
assessment of these issues, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Ch. 8). 
26 The growth data are from Angus Maddison’s vertical file, retrieved on June 1, 2010. 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/vertical-file_02-2010.xls. 
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and this strategic sabotage tends to appear at the aggregate level in the form of stag-
nation.27 The rulers themselves, because of their social position, cannot comprehend, 
let alone accept, this necessity, and their dominant dogmas and ideologies hide and 
deny it. But the historical evidence, particularly during acute crises, proves it time 
and again: unable to see the contradiction, the rulers attempt to alleviate the general 
malaise as well as to keep their redistributional power intact; but because their power 
depends on the sabotage they cause, this attempt invariably fails. 
In light of this discussion, and given the current convergence of redistributional 
and aggregate limits, can we say that the capitalist mode of power is approaching a 
glass ceiling? During the early 2000s, few capitalists were expressing the question in 
such stark terms; but the menacing possibility was certainly lurking in the back-
ground, and with the future looking disheartening at best, most preferred to keep 
their eyes on the immediate past. Share prices started to rise only in October 2002, a 
full six months after the earnings upswing began, and for the next five years they in-
creased in tandem with profits (albeit at a much lower rate). 
And then came the “subprime crisis,” and all hell broke loose.  
 
Is the Dominant Ideology Broken? 
 
As Figure 4 shows, between their June 2007 peak and their May 2009 bottom, earn-
ings fell by 91% – a decline greater than the 75% collapse experienced during the first 
three years of the Great Depression. If capitalism were here to stay, this must have 
been the mother of all investment opportunities: with profits bound to rebound back 
to their long-term trend, their rise was sure to be spectacular – as were the gains to 
investors loyal to the forward-looking ritual. But few seemed convinced. And, so, 
instead of anticipating the Galtonian reversion to trend, share prices continued to 
slide, closely following the footsteps of current earnings. 
Given that the bear market, measured in rates of change, was approaching his-
torical lows, and since such bottoms had previously always been followed by major 
upswings, many forward-looking strategists – from permanent bull Barton Biggs, to 
Wizard of Omaha Warren Buffet, to doom-and-gloom Martin Wolf – were advising 
their followers to fasten their seat belts in preparation for an imminent takeoff.28 And 
in early 2009 they were finally vindicated.  
But the rebound had to do neither with the advice of analysts nor with the pre-
science of capitalists. The real trigger was earnings. Recall that, by now, investors 
had lost their belief in the inevitable, at least for the time being, and that instead of 
looking forward to eternity they kept staring at the past. Everyone was glued to the 
                                                 
27 The first to elaborate the concept of strategic sabotage and its importance for the power of 
rulers in general and for capitalists in particular was Thorstein Veblen (1904; 1923). For 
further theoretical and empirical development of this association, see Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009a: Ch. 12). 
28 See Biggs (2008), Buffett (2008) and Wolf (2008). 
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earning cycle, anxiously waiting for it to find a bottom. And, sure enough, it was 
only after profits finally started to increase that stock prices began to rise.29 By April 
2010, the market was up 60%; but as with the decline, the increase, too, merely 
traced the path of earnings. Given the thrust of the profit up-cycle, though, with earn-
ings having risen more than nine-fold from their near-zero level at the 2008 bottom, 
the question arises again: why are investors still behaving as if they doubt that the 
upswing is real, not to say sustainable? 
In our view, the answer is that the crisis of the late 2000s reintroduced an addi-
tional and far deeper form of fear. During the early 2000s, the concern was largely 
practical: the stock market appeared to be running out of fuel, and the main fear, 
however fuzzy, was that the level of capitalization may have been approaching a glass 
ceiling. But since the late 2000s, the very ideology of capitalization has been put into 
question: the capitalist class seems to have lost confidence in its own theories and 
rituals – and, therefore, in its ability to rule. 
“Uncertainty is the only certain thing in this crisis,” bemoan the editors of the 
Financial Times. As of today, nobody knows what is going to happen: 
 
[A] dense fog of confusion has . . . descended, obscuring where we are – fal-
ling fast, slowly, bumping along the bottom, or finally turning the cor-
ner. . . . Economies are behaving unpredictably and will continue to do so. 
The instability is both cause and consequence of the great uncertainty that 
has been spreading out from the financial markets. Fearful and confused, 
people react erratically to changing news, reinforcing confused market be-
havour. It doesn’t help that our economic theories were constructed for a 
different world. Most models depict economies close to equilibrium. . . . 
And unlike what most models assume, prices are not properly clearing all 
markets. . . . [etc. etc.] (Editors 2009) 
 
This sentiment is echoed in numerous publications and speeches, academic and 
popular. “The whole intellectual edifice . . . collapsed in the summer of last year,” 
concedes former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan (Andrews 2008). “Our world is 
broken – and I honestly don’t know what is going to replace it,” grieves Bernie 
Sucher of Merrill Lynch. “[T]he pillars of faith on which this new financial capital-
ism were built have all but collapsed,” observes Gillian Tett in a special Financial 
Times series on the future of capitalism, and that collapse, she concludes, “has left 
everyone from finance minister or central banker to small investor or pension holder 
                                                 
29 When we prepared the earlier version of this paper (Nitzan and Bichler 2009b), stock prices 
had already begun to rise, but the aggregate earnings numbers, which are calculated from firm-
level data with a few months’ delay, were still unavailable. Doubtful that the coming rally 
marked the end of systemic fear, we wrote that “the early 2009 increase in prices could end up 
being correlated with a yet-to-be reported rise in current earnings” – a projection that 
subsequent data proved correct. 
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bereft of an intellectual compass, dazed and confused (Tett 2009). And with no intel-
lectual compass to rely on, confesses Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, 
“judging the balance of influences on the economy” becomes “extraordinary diffi-
cult” (Editors 2009). 
Financial crisis, argues György Lukács, threatens the foundations of the capital-
ist regime. The ruling class loses its self-confidence and begins to substitute ad-hoc 
excuses for natural-state-of-things theories. And as the ideological glue that holds the 
regime together weakens, class conflict becomes visible through the cracks of univer-
sal rhetoric, while the threat of naked force suddenly looms large behind the front 
window of tolerance. 
The present stage of the crisis fits this pattern, and so do the justifications. Some, 
like Alan Greenspan, blame it all on humans failing to live up to their true nature:  
  
All the sophisticated mathematics and computer wizardry essentially rested 
on one central premise: that the enlightened self-interest of owners and 
managers of financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient 
buffer against insolvency by actively monitoring their firm’s capital and risk 
position. (Greenspan 2009).  
 
[T]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to 
protect shareholder’s equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked dis-
belief. Such counterparty surveillance is a central pillar of our financial mar-
kets’ state of balance. If it fails, as occurred this year, market stability is un-
dermined. (U.S. Congress 2008) 
 
Other observers, like Oxford economist John Kay, see the fault not at the level of 
the individual, but of the system as a whole. When the Queen of England wondered 
why “the credit crisis and its evolution were not predicted” by the experts, her “loyal 
subject” (as Kay names himself), quickly jumped to his colleagues’ defense. National 
economies, financial markets and businesses, he explained, are simply too complex, 
dynamic and non-linear, and these systemic intricacies turn prediction into a “wild 
goose chase” (Kay 2008).  
And then there are those, like financial commentator Gideon Rachman, for 
whom the problem is largely temporary. The economists, Rachman suggests, have 
actually made great strides in understanding how the economy works. But from time 
to time the delicate machine gets infected by a “new type of economic virus,” and we 
need to be a bit patient until the economists discover the cure (Rachman 2009).  
By 2010, though, it seems that the virus continues to elude the pundits. The 
threat of default has spread from business enterprise to sovereign governments, with 
countries like Iceland, Dubai, Greece and who-knows-who-is-next flirting with bank-
ruptcy. Participants at a special conference hosted by Soros’ Institute for New Eco-
nomic Thinking at Kings College, including five Nobel-winning economists, ex-
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pressed grave concern that “many investors now find it hard to judge the ‘real’ riski-
ness of sovereign debt.” Gillian Tett conveys the atmosphere of theoretical bewil-
derment and ideological anxiety:  
 
Three years ago, it seemed inconceivable that a country such as Greece 
would be allowed to default, or exit the eurozone. But back then it seemed 
equally hard to imagine that Lehman Brothers might fail. Now that Lehman 
has gone, who knows what the worst-case scenario might be? Could the eu-
rozone break up? Could Greece default? What might happen to other debt-
laden nations, such as the US, if the worst case scenario occurred? The one 
thing that is clear is that the answers to those questions now depend as much 
on culture and politics as on macro-economics. . . . In this new world of 
sovereign risk, what really matters is a set of issues that cannot be plugged 
into a spreadsheet. The old compass no longer works. (Tett 2010) 
 
The predicament is so serious that even the know-all “market” – the collective 
brain of the capitalist class – has become disoriented. According to Martin Wolf, 
chief economics commentator at the Financial Times, the markets “don’t know what 
to fear: will it end up in deflation, default, inflation, financial shocks, or all of these?” 
“Markets are unpredictable,” he informs his son, “like children. . . .” And when the 
youngster asks “So what’s going to happen next?” the elder, who is usually able to 
answer questions that most people cannot even ask, replies: “If I knew that, I 
wouldn’t be a mere economic journalist. . . .” (Wolf 2010) 
 
Mene, Mene, Tekel, and Parsin: Is Capitalism Heading for Systemic Collapse? 
 
The decade-long breakdown of capitalization is no fluke. The fact that for ten years 
now capitalists have been pricing equities based on past profit betrays deep distress. 
Their fear now is not only that the level of capitalization may be bumping into a 
glass ceiling; it is also that the very ritual of capitalization – the universal crystal ball 
through which they have been “seeing” the future for nearly a century – may be giv-
ing them awfully wrong signals. And when the future looks bleak, and the dominant 
ideology appears opaque if not misleading, there arises the specter of systemic fear. 
Given the foregoing, the obvious question to ask is: does systemic fear signal the 
imminent collapse of capitalism?  
This is by no means an easy question to answer. The difficulty is threefold. First, 
systemic fear – in capitalism as in other modes of power – is rare and therefore diffi-
cult to generalize about. Second, although much has been written about previous 
episodes of social collapse, it is unclear how much of it applies to the capitalist mode 
of power. Third and finally, systemic fear and systemic collapse are deeply inter-
twined in ways that may not be easy to disentangle. Nonetheless, given that we are 
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dealing with the very existence of capitalism, discussing these questions – even 
speculatively, as we do in the remainder of the paper – seems appropriate. 
To start with, we need to distinguish between gradual decline and final collapse. 
The slow weakening of a mode of power – for instance, the prolonged descent of 
European feudalism, or the progressive decay of Soviet Union – can happen for 
many different reasons, stretched over a long period of time. But, in our view, for a 
mode of power to finally implode, these reasons must be complemented by the loss 
of confidence in obedience. When the ruling class is no longer certain of its ability to 
govern, it becomes indecisive; indecision inhibits ruthlessness; lack of ruthlessness 
fuels opposition; and effective opposition is the other side of disintegrating rule. It is 
only at that point, when it becomes obvious that the ruling class, benumbed by sys-
temic fear, has lost control, that final collapse becomes possible.  
Systemic fear often appears when it is least expected. On the surface, the mode 
of power seems unassailable, the rulers hubristic and the underlying population sub-
missive. But under the surface, redistribution requires greater sabotage and larger 
doses of force, and as social stress builds up, the stage is set for the crucial inversion. 
One such drama is narrated in the biblical story of Babylon. The last Babylonian em-
peror, Belshazzar, celebrates the height of his power at a sacred royal feast when, 
suddenly, a mysterious hand comes out to put an indecipherable writing on his wall 
and sudden terror in his heart: “the king's color changed, and his thoughts alarmed 
him; his limbs gave way, and his knees knocked together” (Book of Daniel, Ch. 5: 
Verse 6). None of his enchanters, Chaldeans or astrologers can read the strange writ-
ing. Only one pundit – a foreign analyst named Daniel – knows what it means. 
“Mene, Mene, Tekel, and Parsin,” he reads the menacing omen: “MENE, God has 
numbered the days of your kingdom and brought it to an end; TEKEL, you have 
been weighed in the balances and found wanting; PERES, your kingdom is divided 
and given to the Medes and Persians” (Ch. 5, Verses 24-28). That very night, the 
king is slain, and his empire collapses. 
The socio-ecological collapse of Easter Island, whose final implosion occurred 
sometime during the seventeenth century, was also triggered by hubris-cum-fear. In a 
last-ditch effort to stave off their decline, the island’s rulers engaged in a competitive 
orgy of statue building. The likely purpose was to bolster their status and self confi-
dence; but since statue building did nothing to alter the social structure, the only con-
sequence was a hastening of the destruction of their environment and the demise of 
their mode of power. Soon after, the rulers and priests fled, the island sank into civil 
war, a new religion came into being, and the giant moai statues – the chief symbol of 
the rulers’ power – were systemically toppled and broken (Diamond 2005: Ch. 2).  
A similar story can be told of the Soviet Union. Shortly before its collapse, Gen-
eral Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev asserted that Perestroika was a “revolution from 
above,” and that, “Naturally, we [read the country’s rulers] have no intention to 
change Soviet power; we will not depart from its basic principles” (Gorbachev 1987: 
30-31). But signs of deep fear were there for everyone to see – from the Party’s ad-
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mission that administered prices distorted the law of value (whatever that “law” 
means) to its apprehension that central planning could no longer deliver growth to 
keep the mode of power together. “We only thought we were in the saddle,” con-
fessed Gorbachev, “while the actual situation that was arising was one that Lenin 
warned against: the automobile was not going where the one at the steering wheel 
thought it was going” (p. 18). Two years later, the Soviet Union was no more.  
The collapse of a mode of power is always underwritten by its own historical cir-
cumstances. But as these and numerous other examples suggest, it is the rulers’ sys-
temic fear and loss of confidence that makes those circumstances – whatever they are 
– culminate in an abrupt crash. In and of themselves, fear and loss of confidence are 
rarely if ever sufficient to set off the implosion; but they are always necessary, and that 
necessity makes them important to analyze. 
  
Complex Systems and Time Transformers 
  
As noted, systemic fear is not unique to capitalism. But in our opinion, the likelihood 
of systemic fear turning gradual decline into rapid collapse is much greater in capital-
ism than in any prior mode of power. There are two related reasons for this claim. 
First, modern capitalism is much more “complex” than earlier modes of power, and 
that complexity makes it susceptible to implosion.30 Second, unlike other modes of 
power, the ritual of capitalization acts as a “time transformer”: it condenses the long 
future into the singular present, and that reduction can turn capitalist expectations – 
particularly during times of systemic fear – into an immediate reality. Let’s consider 
these reasons more closely. 
Most of the time, the high complexity of capitalism allows it to quell and en-
compass limited challenges to power and local breakdowns of rule. But the agility 
and flexibility of capitalism have limits, and when these limits are crossed, complex-
ity can turn “against the system.” At that point, internal challenge, external attack 
and ecological calamity, instead of being counteracted and absorbed, get amplified. 
And as the reverberations spread, the system doesn’t simply weaken; it implodes.  
This type of scenario, in which complexity facilitates collapse, is spelled out in 
David Korowicz’s Tipping Point (2010). His argument, like others in this genre, 
builds mainly on standard “real-growth” economics, of which we are critical, and it 
offers very little discussion of the power relations that we emphasize. But his analysis 
of complexity could easily be extended to a broader power perspective and therefore 
is worth exploring in some detail.  
Korowicz claims that the imminent peaking of oil production is a “tipping 
point” – a threshold beyond which capitalist civilization will not simply decline, but 
                                                 
30 Although there is no single definition of “complexity,” there can be little doubt that capital-
ist society is more temporally and spatially integrated than any prior mode of power; that it 
comprises many more “relationships”; that these relationships have many more nonlinearities; 
that differential information plays a more crucial role; etc.  
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rapidly disintegrate. His initial premises are similar to those of most peak-oil analysts: 
(1) capitalism requires continuous economic growth; (2) ongoing economic growth 
necessitates ever-increasing energy inputs; (3) the key energy input – oil and its de-
rivatives – has no immediate substitutes; and (4) once the production of oil – and of 
fossil fuels more generally – peaks and starts to decline, economic growth and the 
capitalism that is based on it must follow suit. The disagreement is over what fol-
lows. According to most analysts, the systemic consequences of peak oil are likely to 
be gradual: the optimists envisage an unstable period during which the piecemeal 
development of renewable energy sources and energy-saving techniques substitutes 
for the decline of fossil fuels, while the pessimists see a drawn-out process of deindus-
trialization and social decline. For Korowicz, though, these gradual scripts all suffer 
from a crucial omission: they ignore the operational fabric of capitalism, and that 
oversight leads them to the wrong conclusion.  
Global production, he says, is mediated through highly complex and deeply in-
tertwined critical infrastructures – including money, trade, transportation, communi-
cations, water, and electricity, among others. The operation of these integrated infra-
structures rests on and presupposes the ongoing expansion of credit and debt. And 
that expansion is possible only because investors believe that the additional credit 
and debt will be serviced and ultimately repaid. According to Korowicz, though, this 
latter belief – and therefore the entire operational fabric that rests on it – can only 
hold in a growing economy. And here lies the trap.  
Once humanity passes the threshold of peak oil, economic growth must turn 
negative – and, at that point, the assumption of ever-growing credit and debt breaks 
down. Investors suddenly realize that, looking forward, their assets have an inher-
ently negative yield. And since this realization inverts the basis on which the whole 
society operates, the result is not a gradual decline but sudden collapse. The first to 
tank are the equity and debt markets; these are followed by mutually reinforcing re-
verberations and the eventual rupture of money, trade, investment, communications 
and other critical infrastructures; and the process is then sealed by conflict, war and 
die-off (as argued for example by Jay Hanson).31  
Note that the collapse here begins with a seemingly inconspicuous change. 
Roughly half of the oil is still under ground, and its extraction rate is still positive. 
But that rate, instead of accelerating, is now decelerating, and this deceleration is 
enough to set the social avalanche in motion. Because the operational fabric of capi-
talism is highly complex and mediated by forward-looking debt and credit, the mere 
realization that this is the beginning of a long, secular decline in oil output causes a 
contiguous implosion of the entire society.  
                                                 
31 Jay Hanson was one of first to emphasize and bring to public attention the social 
consequences of peak oil. For an abstract of his views, along with an annotated bibliography, 
see Dieoff (http://dieoff.org/index.html). Similar expressions of concern can be found in the 
many discussions on The Oil Drum (http://www.theoildrum.com/).  
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Korowicz’s collapse scenario focuses on peak oil, but its dynamics can be readily 
generalized. Regardless of whether the capitalist of mode of power is expanding, de-
clining or collapsing, the forces that drive it – social as well as ecological – are always 
mediated through the ritual of capitalization. This ritual is unlike any the world has 
ever known. It endows every member of society with a miraculous power previously 
reserved to wizards, oracles and prophets: the ability to “transform” the future into 
the present. By discounting expected future earnings and risk, capitalization encapsu-
lates their complex social and ecological causes into a single value – and then sends it 
back to the present.  
Under normal circumstances, this all-encompassing “time transformer” enables 
capitalists to mange their fears and exert their power in ways that previous rulers 
could only have dreamed of. But the ritual also has a dark side, a lightning-like men-
ace that prior rulers could not even fathom. As long as capitalists take their mode of 
power for granted, capitalization makes their power appear unassailable. But when 
they begin to doubt their own ability to rule, any serious future threat – from peak oil 
and climate change to the inability to further redistribute income and reduce earning 
volatility – can be time-transformed into an immediate collapse.  
  
Warning Signs? 
 
This threat perhaps explains, at least in part, the growing literature on systemic col-
lapse: Why do complex systems implode? Is the disintegration patterned? And if so, 
is there a clear “writing on the wall”? Can we find warning signs to help us anticipate 
and perhaps prevent the calamity?32 Analytical and empirical modeling of natural 
phenomena suggests that “collapse” – formally defined as a rapid or quantum-like 
shift of the system from a high to a low level of complexity – tends to have fairly 
clear patterns. Moreover, very often collapse is preceded by quantitative warning 
signs: the key variables of the system may begin to flicker between alternate states; 
they may become slow to recover from small perturbations; they may exhibit a surge 
of path dependency in the form of rising autocorrelation; and they may display rising 
cross-correlations between different components of the system. Most remarkably, 
through, these warnings signs seem to be generic – i.e., they tend to occur independ-
ently of the concrete features of the system in question.33  
However, identifying similar warnings signs in complex social system is far more 
difficult. There are two reasons for this difficulty. First, until capitalism, most modes 
of power generated very little quantitative information, so it is hard to see how uni-
versal warnings signs can be constructed in the first place. Second, unlike natural 
systems, society contains an inescapable entanglement: its actual trajectory is inextri-
                                                 
32 See for example, Tainter (1988; 2000), Diamond (2005), Kambhu, Weidman and Krishnan 
(2007), May, Levin and Sugihara (2008), Orlov (2008) and Scheffer (2009). 
33 For a succinct summary of these findings, see Scheffer et al. (2009). 
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cably bound up with its dominant dogmas, ideologies and theories.34 Under normal 
circumstances, the latter seems useful in describing and even “predicting” the former. 
But as the system approaches collapse, so do its leading dogmas, ideologies and theo-
ries – and at that point, prediction and even description based on these dogmas, ide-
ologies and theories becomes difficult if not impossible. Let’s unzip these reasons, 
staring with quantities. 
 
Quantification 
 
As the dismal record of apocalyptic prophecies warns us, predicting collapse before it 
happens is much harder than explaining it afterwards. One stumbling block is that, 
until recently, historical societies simply didn’t provide the kind of quantitative in-
formation with which physicists, biologist and environmentalists make their predic-
tions. It is true that nowadays we may know quite a lot about these historical socie-
ties. But the data we posses commonly come from ex-post excavation, research and 
estimates. Most were unavailable and in many cases inconceivable when these socie-
ties existed, leaving the art of social prediction to astrologers and oracles. 
The arrival of capitalism abolished this scarcity. For the first time in history, so-
cial quantities became abundant to the point of being virtually free. The price system 
quantifies everything that can be owned – from tangible and intangible objects, to 
human beings, to social structures – and the application of probability and statistics 
shapes these quantities into an infinitely complex numerical structure. This is the 
quantitative context from which political economy, the first mechanical science of 
society, came into being; it is the bedrock on which social sciences could subse-
quently flourish, and it is the raw material that gives contemporary students of soci-
ety the confidence that they can scientifically articulate its future. 
 
Entanglement 
 
The most successful, at least in their own opinion, are the economists. Their quanti-
tative models, large and small, track the regularities of production, consumption, 
prices and finance, and they provide certain boundaries within which future eco-
nomic events – such as growth, inflation and government deficits – are likely to un-
fold. 
However, this quantitative scheme, which mimics the natural sciences, has an 
important weakness: it takes it for granted that there exists an underlying “model” 
that regulates the economy/society, and it further assumes that this model is unchang-
ing. This dual assumption may seem adequate for complex natural systems, whose 
various states – whether stable, gradually changing or leaping into collapse – are be-
                                                 
34 This entanglement has been long recognized, with its most recent application being George 
Soros’ “reflexivity” (1998). 
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lieved to be governed by the same heteronomous rules. But unlike in nature, the rules 
of society are autonomous. They are created not by an external logic, but by society 
itself.35 And that autonomy implies that the collapse of society and the disintegration 
of its rules, by definition, are one and the same.  
The flip side of this implication is that, until the collapse actually begins and the 
dominant ritual of capitalization crumbles, capitalists are more or less compelled to 
deny what is in front of their nose: 
 
[W]e are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue. . . . 
[T]he frightening facts can exist some where or other in [. . .] consciousness, 
simultaneously known and not known. . . . Intellectually, it is possible to 
carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is that 
sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality. . . .” (Orwell 
1946) 
 
However, because capitalism is deeply entangled with its dominant ideology, as long 
as that ideology prevents capitalists from accepting the demise of their society, the 
“solid reality” remains fluid and the collapse indeterminate.  
 
Indeterminacy 
 
This indeterminacy is evident in accounts such as Korowicz’s Tipping Point. Reduced 
to its bare essentials, the critical assumption underlying his collapse scenario is a 
temporal mismatch between the hard facts and mass psychology: the development 
and implementation of alternative energy sources, he says, is simply too slow to pre-
vent investors from plunging into terminal pessimism. Korowicz does not deny that 
there are existing alternatives to oil, and that other options might be discovered or 
invented. The problem is that, barring a scientific-technological miracle, there isn’t 
enough time to develop and implement these alternatives on a sufficiently large 
scale.36 Most energy observers believe that oil production has already peaked or that 
it will peak within the next twenty years.37 In other words, whatever the alternatives 
to oil, they are too little, too late. And since the increase of alternative energy sources 
will lag the drop of oil, he says, it is virtually certain that overall energy production 
will peak sometime within the next few decades. Moreover, if peak energy ends up 
triggering social collapse, there is little chance of the alternative energy infrastructure 
ever growing beyond its pre-collapse levels. 
                                                 
35 The notions of heteronomy and autonomy, traceable to the ancient Greeks, are developed in 
the social and philosophical writings of Cornelius Castoriadis (see, for instance, 1991). 
36 On the limits of renewable energy, see for example Ted Trainer (2010). 
37 Korokwicz shows that, cumulatively, 30% of the experts think that the decline has already 
begun, 50% feel it will happen before 2015, and 95% believe it will occur before 2030 (pp. 51-
52). 
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This sequence, though, isn’t as tight as it may seem. Note that, according to 
Korowicz, the collapse is triggered not by peak oil per se, but by a decisive psycho-
logical change in investors’ expectations regarding that reality. Now, for the latter to 
follow from the former, investors must come to believe all of the following: (1) that 
peak oil has already happened or is imminent; (2) that peak oil will be followed by an 
irreversible decline in overall energy production; and (3) that the drop in capitaliza-
tion caused by the decline of energy will not be offset by opposite forces that 
Korowicz does not discuss – for instance, by further pecuniary redistribution in favor 
of capitalists, by greater concentration of ownership in favor of leading capitalists, 
etc. 
Although possible, none of these changes in expectations is imminent, or even 
necessary. After all, theories of resource scarcity date back to Malthus if not earlier, 
and the inevitability of peak oil was spelled out already in the 1950s – and, yet, ra-
tionally or not, so far investors have chosen to ignore or deny these forward-looking 
pronouncements. Moreover, even if peak oil were imminent (which it may well be), 
and even if at some point investors do come to accept it (which isn’t far fetched), 
they might still shy from immediately concluding that the overall production of en-
ergy is about to decline. And if the latter conclusion is postponed for long enough, 
alternative energy sources might have sufficient time to replace falling oil production, 
thus removing the specter of immediate capitalist collapse, and perhaps even of a 
drawn out decline. Finally, even if these aggregate processes cannot be stopped, capi-
talists may still bank their hopes on forceful redistribution to offset the aggregate loss 
of social energy.  
 
Systemic Fear and the Future of Capitalism 
 
In sum, capitalism is the first mode of power to be truly quantified, and it is defi-
nitely the most complex. These intertwined features suggest that, when faced with 
adverse social and ecological circumstances, its structure is susceptible, perhaps more 
than earlier modes of power, to sudden systemic collapse. And judging by the schol-
arly and popular attention, there seems to be a growing feeling that such a collapse 
may be in the offing. But despite the heightened interest and sophisticated analysis, 
nobody has been able to say how likely the collapse is and when it may happen. 
The reason for the difficulty is that the science of complex natural systems may 
not be readily applicable to complex social systems. The amount of comparative 
quantitative data on most historical systems remains too limited to draw meaningful 
generalizations; and even in the capitalist mode of power, where the data seem limit-
less, the entanglement of society-as-an-object with society-as-a-subject, particularly 
during periods of deep crisis, creates an infinite regress that cannot be disentangled. 
However, while the likelihood and timing of capitalist collapse is impossible to 
foretell, some of the preconditions for such collapse may be readily observable. In this 
paper, we have argued that in order for a mode of power to collapse, the ruling class 
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must lose its confidence in obedience. This confidence, articulated and enforced by 
the dominant ideology, is the glue that holds the mode of power together; and it is 
only when the ruling class is struck by systemic fear and the glue disintegrates that 
collapse becomes possible.  
Historical analyses of social collapse tend to ignore this factor, and perhaps for a 
good reason. History tells us very little about confidence in obedience, and the little 
that we do know is rarely if ever quantitative and therefore difficult to analyze sys-
tematically. But capitalism is very different. Unlike earlier modes of power, it is 
quantified to the teeth, and that quantification includes the mindset of the ruling class.  
The chief form of quantification is the universal ritual that all capitalists are con-
ditioned to perform: capitalization. Under normal circumstances, the performance of 
this ritual quantifies the way capitalists expect their power to unfold: the earnings 
they hope to redistribute, the risk they try to minimize and the normal rate of return 
that secures their rule as natural and their command as eternal. But during times of 
systemic fear, when the very future of their power is put into question, discounting 
cannot be properly performed, and the capitalization ritual, which otherwise embod-
ies their confidence in obedience, breaks down. 
This breakdown is readily visible, but only indirectly. Looking at the stock mar-
ket alone doesn’t help. Equity prices may fall sharply or even collapse; but if the ob-
served decline properly discounts the change in investors’ expatiations, it actually 
serves to confirm that the ritual of capitalization is fully operational and that the capi-
talist class, however uneasy in the short term, retains its long-term confidence in 
obedience.  
In order to see that something is systemically wrong, we need to think not posi-
tively, but negatively. Specifically, we need to look for market patterns that are inher-
ently inconsistent with forward-looking capitalization. The manifestation of such pat-
terns would then prove, by negation, that the ritual is broken. The specific pattern 
emphasized in this paper is one in which stock prices, instead of looking into the 
deep future, nervously trace the ups and downs of current and past earnings. This 
backward-looking pattern goes against the very gist of forward-looking finance. And 
when it emerges – as it did during the crisis of the 1930s and again in 2000 – we can 
be fairly certain that capitalization has broken down and that the ruling class has lost 
its confidence in obedience.  
A shrewd academic might have leveraged this apparent anomaly into a full-
blown mechanized model, complete with a universal taxonomy of “fear-of-death” 
eras, a sliding scale of price-profit correlations alerting investors when to switch and 
reswitch between forward- and backward-looking postures, and an easy-to-follow list 
of “how to profit” from both. And judging by what is on sale in the analysis market, 
this model could end up having plenty of paying followers.  
We prefer to forego this investment opportunity and instead keep our specula-
tions tentative and free. Capitalism may survive this systemic crisis, as it survived 
that of the 1930s. As before, this survival may require a significant transformation – 
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one that restructures the entire architecture of power, including its material technol-
ogy and dominant ideology – and such transformation is certainly possible. But there 
is also a very real possibility that the current crisis will prove too much for the capi-
talist class to handle. “The history of all hitherto existing society,” write Marx and 
Engels in the opening paragraphs of the Communist Manifesto, “is the history of class 
struggles.” And that struggle can end “either in a revolutionary reconstitution of so-
ciety at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes (Marx and Engels 
1884: 57-58). 
So far, the capitalists’ loss of confidence in obedience hasn’t elicited significance 
opposition – but that can change quickly. However, if the opposition fails to establish 
an effective and hopefully progressive alternative – an alternative that so far seems 
absent – it is not impossible for the reverberations of the clash, amplified by the high 
complexity of capitalism, to culminate in systemic collapse and collective ruin.  
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